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Abstract
In this article, we analyse the mechanisms of agenda setting by focusing on the determinants of individual 
attitudes towards crime and investigating the role played by the media. After a brief literature review 
supporting the relevance of the selected topic of inquiry and the presentation of our analytical framework, 
we study the persuasion effects of mass media. More specifically, we investigate how TV exposure can shape 
individual perceptions of specific issues such as crime, and then focus on the effects of exposure to crime 
news on voting decisions. Using the Italian 2001 general election as an important case study of TV power 
concentration, we provide evidence that media-induced agenda setting enhanced the salience of the crime 
issue in voters’ minds during the 2001 Italian general election and contributed to the victory of the coalition 
led by Silvio Berlusconi. Interestingly, our results are partially driven by the switch of previous left-wing 
voters to voting for the centre right because of exposure to crime news.
Keywords
Fear, media systems, electoral behaviour, Italy
Introduction
The role of fear in politics is a hotly debated issue in contemporary political science and political 
sociology literature. A number of scholars have argued that geopolitics is now governed by emo-
tions and that fear governs Western politics in both international and national contexts: ‘fear leads 
to a defensive attitude that reveals and reflects the identity and the fragility of a person, a culture, 
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or a civilization at a given moment’ (Moisi, 2009: 92; see also Furedi, 2005). Furthermore, a grow-
ing body of literature is focusing on the relevance of domestic factors, such as economic condi-
tions, immigration and crime in driving the emotional and fearful reactions of citizens and voters. 
In such a context, the role of media in shaping human behaviour and ultimately the outcome of 
political elections is crucial in understanding the way in which political elections may be domi-
nated by emotions.
In this article, we consider critically these arguments and attempt to study the political influence 
of TV through a specific channel: fear of crime. The definition of fear we adopt is that of Witte 
(1992): ‘fear is a negatively-valanced emotion, accompanied by a high-level of arousal, and elic-
ited by a threat that is perceived to be significant and personally relevant’. In our contribution we 
try to evaluate the impact of TV media on agenda-setting, for example, on the selection of the key 
issues of political agendas. More specifically, we study a context in which a medium (TV) trans-
mits a disproportionate amount of crime news, and crime is a relevant topic in the political agenda. 
Consequently, in our main research hypothesis, voters – scared by crime – vote for the party that 
they think can best address the issue.
In terms of policy fields, we have selected crime as a policy area since – after economic stability 
– it is today considered the most relevant among the citizens surveyed through World Values 
Survey (WVS, 2005–2008). Furthermore, due to the exploratory nature of the article, we will focus 
on one crucial case (Gerring, 2007). Italy is particularly interesting due to its current limited media 
(especially TV) pluralism: it has been defined as ‘partly free’ in the most recent annual Freedom 
House survey (2011), ranking 32nd, one of the three European Union countries (together with 
Bulgaria and Romania) not to be considered as ‘free’. Put differently, we are mainly interested in 
verifying the impact of crime news coverage by TV news programmes in Italy in the period of the 
2001 political election on the salience attributed by voters to crime and, through this channel, 
assess the influence TV media exerts in a given media system. In order to answer our research 
question, we use microdata from the 2001 Italian Electoral Survey and propose a methodology that 
shows how crime news affects the beliefs of voters and their electoral behaviour.
The main findings of the article can be summarized as follows: in a context of direct TV power 
concentration in the hands of key political leaders, the capacity to shape the political agenda and 
impose it on the media agenda is particularly high. In our focus on a specific electoral period, we 
provide robust evidence of such a capacity with respect to reported crime, which was declining in 
reality but due to its electoral salience, increasingly covered by TV news on the channels owned by 
the political leader and his family. The article develops the arguments by introducing the analytical 
framework and the overall research design (section 2), presenting the methodology and the data 
(section 3), the results (section 4) and concluding remarks (section 5).
Political agenda setting, media agenda setting and impact analysis: 
Research design and hypothesis
Media and TV models
The role of mass media in political marketing is crucial in electoral strategy to gain or build con-
sensus around policies and politicians. According to the growing literature on media capture, news-
papers provide press coverage of the issues that appear to be politically more important (Larcinese 
et al., 2011); media are also relevant in framing the political agenda (McCombs, 2005; McCombs 
and Shaw, 1972) and the agenda setting dynamics may vary since they are grounded in different 
media systems (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). With this regard, the most important contribution to the 
literature on media regulation systems is Hallin and Mancini (2004). The authors suggest looking 
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at media regulation with respect to four dimensions, and according to their analysis, three ‘media 
systems’ are identified in Europe: (a) the polarized pluralist model (among other countries France 
and Italy) which is characterized by low levels of newspaper circulation and journalistic profes-
sionalization as well as by high levels of political parallelism and state intervention; (b) the demo-
cratic corporatist model (among other countries Germany and Sweden) which is characterized by 
high levels of mass circulation press and political parallelism, a high degree of journalistic profes-
sionalization and state intervention; and (c) the liberal model (among other countries United 
Kingdom and United States) which is characterized by medium levels of media circulation, strong 
professionalization and low levels of parallelism – with the exception of the United Kingdom – and 
state intervention. Although the authors stress that the three models are ‘ideal types’ and that media 
systems are not static, their main argument is that variations in political systems will persist and 
continue to shape (and be shaped) by the media (Puglisi, 2011).
Although very promising and widely cited, Hallin and Mancini’s contribution does not fully 
take into account the specific ‘agenda setting’ potential of TV news – which, as it is well known, 
has become increasingly relevant as a source of political information in contemporary democra-
cies. Therefore, if we focus on one specific medium – TV – and we consider the degree of TV 
power as a classifying criterion, then we may question whether Italy remains an example of a 
polarized pluralist model. Italy is a crucial case since – beyond public broadcasters – for over a 
decade the overall power concentration of the leader of the centre right, Silvio Berlusconi and his 
family has been extremely high (see also Durante and Knight, 2012); furthermore, together with 
the main private TV channels owned by the Berlusconi family (Canale 5, Retequattro and Italia 1), 
previously to the years under scrutiny in this article all the public channels (RAI 1, RAI 2 and RAI 
3) have been controlled by various Parliamentary nominees (Mancini, 2009), among which we 
could also find people nominated by Berlusconi’s centre-right representatives. Therefore, although 
pluralism can be seen in the appointment of the key public TV managers (Mancini, 2009: 125–126) 
and Berlusconi’s party was in opposition during the 1996–2001 period, the fact that three out of the 
six main TV channels have been constantly fully controlled by the leader of the centre-right coali-
tion is per se a clear indicator of how concentrated the Italian TV system was. We hypothesize that 
this TV power concentration may have significant effects in defining the political agenda, espe-
cially in times of elections; put differently, taking into account the public and private TV media 
system, over the past twenty years (1996–2016) the Italian model is less pluralist and more heavily 
concentrated, being better labelled as an example of a highly concentrated model rather than a 
polarized pluralism model.
TV and agenda setting in a highly concentrated model
For several years, under the same ‘agenda setting’ label two sets of literature have lived together. 
From a policy analysis perspective, agenda setting has been defined by Kingdon as ‘the list of 
subjects or problems to which government officials, and people outside of government closely 
associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention at any given time…the agenda 
setting process narrows [a] set of conceivable subjects to the set that actually becomes the focus of 
attention’ (Kingdon, 1995: 3). The main focus of the path breaking book by Kingdon and the 
empirical research carried out by other policy analysts has been the moment in which a given social 
problem gains public attention and triggers a policy cycle (Howlett et al., 2009). Kingdon’s analy-
sis remains still unrivalled when it comes to macro-determinants, but if we want to focus on the 
specific role played by the media in agenda setting then we are somehow ‘lost in operationaliza-
tion’ since within the ‘grand theory’ provided by Kingdon not much space is left for ‘micro’ vari-
ables such as the media – and TV more specifically.
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To be sure, a relevant media research literature on agenda setting has emerged and consolidated 
over the years by further trying to differentiate agenda setting from other concepts such as framing 
and priming (for a succinct overview, see Weaver, 2007). More generally, since the 1940s, a num-
ber of studies on the impact of the media on voters’ preferences have been conducted (among oth-
ers: Campbell et al., 1960; Converse, 2006; Lazarsfeld et al., 1944), but only in the past two 
decades has a more nuanced analysis of the role of the various media been provided (see for exam-
ple Brians and Wattenberg, 1996). Still partially overlooked is the role played by the media with 
respect to selected issues during the electoral period (for some exceptions, see Petrocik, 1996; 
Wanta and Ghanem, 2007).
A third strand of the literature we consider focused on the impact of TV diffusion on social 
behaviour (see amongst others Gentzkov and Shapiro, 2004; La Ferrara et al., 2008) and on voting 
behaviour (Della Vigna and Kaplan, 2007; Enikolopov et al., 2011; Lawson and MacCann, 2004; 
White et al., 2005).
In order to better grasp the relationship between media power and agenda setting capacities, we 
define: (a) political agenda setting as a process of making a social problem or issue politically sali-
ent, for example, object of debate among institutional (governments, legislatures, etc.) and non-
institutional actors (pressure groups, parties, social movement, etc.); and (b) media agenda setting 
as the process of making a social issue mediatically salient, that is, object of debate within the 
media system of a given political system. A clear distinction between the two types of agenda set-
ting sheds specific light on the mechanisms through which media power may foster political 
agenda-setting capacities and therefore a series of more specific hypotheses can be derived and 
tested empirically. To be sure, empirically there may be overlaps between political agenda setting 
and media agenda setting, but analytically speaking it seems particularly appropriate to distinguish 
between these two types of agenda since – especially during the electoral period –political agenda 
setting may be particularly influenced by media agenda setting, especially when the issues covered 
by the news may be politically salient in terms of acquiring further consensus.
In our study, we focus on the moment where the links between the two above mentioned forms 
of agenda setting are at their peak: the electoral period. In fact, during the electoral period, political 
agenda setting is heavily driven by political campaigning and the contraposition of electoral pro-
grammes – which are contrasting sets of political agendas over which the electorate is called to 
vote. Furthermore, the electoral period is also a moment when the main focus of media news is the 
political competition among the various candidates – whatever the electoral system may be. 
Therefore, during the electoral period – including both the electoral campaign and the day(s) when 
votes are cast – it is accurate to state that the political agenda setting and media agenda setting are 
focusing on the same objects and the links between the two types of agenda setting are particularly 
strong. Finally, during the electoral period of particular relevance is the set of leading actors who 
intervene in both agenda setting types. In cases of extensive TV pluralism (low concentration 
model), we assume the key actors are different and no key actor is in significant control of both 
agenda setting processes; in case of limited media pluralism (high concentration model – the Italian 
case), we assume that the actors may be less differentiated or at least that some hierarchy may be 
established – typically under the form of a political control over the media. This is not to say that 
the Italian case during the electoral period we analyse (2001) was an example of no media plural-
ism: as Berlusconi was not Prime Minister, he did not control both public and private TV. 
Nevertheless, he clearly had significant control with respect to private television and this had evi-
dent repercussions on how differently crime news was reported by private and public television 
(see Mancini, 2003).
By focusing on one medium (TV) the analytical framework we propose here is one in which 
political leaders, through the media, set the political agenda, - the media transmit news strictly 
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related to the issue (for example, crime) which is particularly crucial for voters; and, voters 
receive this signal and form, through fear, beliefs and political attitudes regarding the salience of 
the issues (Figure 1; see Supplementary Material at http://ips.sagepub.com). Although we will 
return to this observation in detail in the next section, the point of departure of our analysis is 
that the more powerful a political leader is in terms of media (TV) power concentration, the more 
probable it is that the political agenda setting will influence the media agenda setting with sig-
nificant repercussions on the perceived salience of a given policy issue (crime) and related vot-
ing behaviour.
Political agenda setting can be understood by looking at the preferences expressed by relevant 
political parties on given policy issues, whereas media agenda setting can be measured via the 
coverage provided with respect to a certain policy issue.
Before going any further, however, we still need to specify the main features of the selected 
issue – crime – and its social consequence – fear – and connect them to our research framework.
The policy issue: The political economy of fear
When do politicians and media have an incentive to scare the voters? Lupia and Menning (2009) 
study the case in which politicians use fear to scare the voters and gain support for policies. They 
argue that many researchers tend to define exogenously (ex-ante) the issues that are supposed to 
scare the voters, hence the authors focus on the sensitivity of voters to particular items, which 
are the ones that politicians use to build consensus over given policies. In other words, they 
argue that fear is a useful political tool only if limited to certain issues, defined by the sensitivity 
of voters.
Voters often have superficial beliefs about policies (mainly economic policies), and politi-
cians reinforce those beliefs through propaganda in order to increase the probability of being 
re-elected (Canes-Wrone et al., 2001; Caplan, 2007). Individuals do not necessarily vote on the 
basis of political programmes or beliefs, rather they may cast their vote focusing on performance 
evaluation of politicians or party identification. In general, media and politicians know the value 
of fear and use it to increase public support and audience (Gardner, 2009). Politicians may gain 
by promoting threats, with the idea that they could be the solution to the problem. This implies 
that part of the political campaign may be based on shaping and using emotions, especially when 
focusing on less educated voters (Brader, 2006). Yet, it is often the more informed who are more 
influenced by fear-driven news and advertising; hence, the role of media – and especially of TV 
– is crucial for spreading fear. In fact, Gardner (2009) reports that broadcast media give dispro-
portionate coverage to criminal and violent events, up to 10–30% of newspaper content. This is 
of vital importance for the aim of our research as we hypothesize that media (TV) influence 
voters’ beliefs not only through direct exposure of politicians, but also through the dispropor-
tionate reporting of news correlated with issues that are high on the political agenda of (one of 
the) political coalitions.
In order to try to link the various strands of the literature mentioned in the previous subsection, 
we first provide some conceptual clarifications and then move on to a formalized analysis of the 
impact of TV on the overall agenda setting in an exploratory case – Italy in 2001 (when a mainly 
majoritarian electoral system was in place).
Our empirical analysis focuses on the 2001 Italian national elections for two main reasons:
(a) the governance structure of the TV system is concentrated in the hands of the parliament 
and of one large private firm owned by the leader of the centre-right coalition, and his 
family;
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(b) in the spirit of Lupia and Menning (2009) we focus on a specific issue that is unanimously 
considered to be politically salient for citizens/voters - crime. The electoral campaign of 
2001 placed considerable emphasis on this issue (ITANES, 2001).
Legnante and Baldassarri (2010) suggest that the media became crucially important in Italy after 
1994. In the 2001 electoral campaign, the centre-right coalition was particularly successful in com-
municating the salience of crucial issues in the programme, such as crime, immigration and taxes 
(Legnante and Baldassarri, 2010).
A first assessment of the diverging pattern between crime news and reported crime rates can be 
conducted by comparing the growth rates in the minutes of crime coverage on TV and the growth 
in reported crimes. As Figure 2 (see Supplementary Material at http://ips.sagepub.com) shows, 
news programmes on private channels (TG4, TG5 and Studio Aperto) have considerably increased 
crime news coverage, whereas public channels have decreased coverage. It should also be noted 
that between 2000 and 2001, the growth rate in the number of homicides was negative and equal 
to −5.61%. Similarly, the growth in the number of overall reported crimes was negative, account-
ing for −1.97% (Ministero dell’Interno, 2006).
The picture that emerges from Figure 2 is that private channels increased disproportionately the 
coverage of crime news and this, according to our view, could be due to an alignment to the issue 
proposed in the political programme of the centre right. At this point, a distinction must be made 
clear. An increasing body of literature is addressing the issue of the relationship between media and 
politics, focusing mainly on measurement issues. In this paper, we assume this link and mainly 
observe the political consequences of crime news exposure. Note that this assumption is corrobo-
rated by the characteristics of the Italian media system outlined previously.
In sum, our main research hypotheses are the following: during the electoral period, in cases of 
power concentration in the TV system, the (TV) media agenda will be heavily influenced by the 
political agenda (RH1) and media information will be selected to correspond to key policy con-
cerns of specific segments of electorate (RH2) – even when the ‘hard’ facts do not correspond to 
the channeled information.
Methodology and data
In terms of operationalization, we look at political agenda by focusing on the relevance on crime 
of the party manifestos of the centre right and centre left coalitions – Casa della Libertà (House of 
Freedom) and L’Ulivo (Olive Tree), respectively. The available evidence suggests that the centre 
right coalitions prioritized crime issues to a greater extent than did the centre left. Of the 15 pages 
which articulate the so called Contratto con gli Italiani (Contract with the Italians), which was the 
main document used by the leader of the centre-right coalition during the electoral period, crime 
issues are the most important topic among the five ‘contractual points’: almost half of the docu-
ment is devoted to such issues (Berlusconi, 2001). In the case of the centre left coalition, which 
presented a more traditional electoral programme of 117 pages, crime issues are much more mar-
ginal with respect to other issues: only three pages are dedicated to crime issues, and they are not 
directly mentioned in the key six challenges outlined in the manifesto (L’Ulivo con Rutelli – 
insieme per l’Italia, 2001: 15). In addition, secondary research has emphasized the greater attention 
paid by the centre-right coalition towards crime issues than the centre left (Mancini, 2003; Marletti, 
2002; Newell, 2003).
In order to test the hypotheses presented in the previous section, we take an innovative route as 
we aim to estimate the marginal impact of a particular type of news (e.g. crime news) on voters’ 
beliefs and on their voting behaviour in the 2001 election. For this purpose, we propose a model in 
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two steps: in the first step we estimate the impact of crime news coverage by major news pro-
grammes on the subjective importance of crime as an issue to be addressed by the new govern-
ment; and in the second step, we estimate the impact of the predicted importance of crime on 
voting behaviour.
Put differently, we estimate a model aimed at explaining voters’ choice as a function of the sali-
ence they attribute to crime, which is linked to measures of crime news watched on TV and an 
index of diffused crime in the region of residence of the voter.
It should be noted that this approach allows us to test the framework we have proposed in sec-
tion 2 since in the first step we estimate an equation in which, given the quantity of crime news 
potentially watched on the TV, voters form their beliefs about the salience of the crime issue, 
whereas in the second step those beliefs are the bases upon which voters elaborate their electoral 
preferences.
Before describing our empirical analysis in detail, it is useful to mention clearly that we do not 
model explicitly (i.e. in statistical terms) the relationship between the political system and the 
medium (TV). This choice is driven by the governance structure of the Italian TV market and 
seems to be a reasonable assumption, as discussed in the previous section.
More formally, in the first step we estimate the following equation for voter i living in region j 
watching mostly news programme k and then news programme h
 Crime imp X Crime Crime ews FirstNP SecondNij i j kh i_ _= + + + + +α β γ φ ϕ θn Pi i+ε  (1)
where Crime_imp is the subjective importance of crime in the government action, X is a vector of 
individual characteristics, Crime is a crime index in the region of residence of the voter, Crime_
news is an index aggregating crime news coverage of the most watched and of the second most 
watched news programmes, FirstNP and SecondNP are fixed effects for the most watched and the 
second most watched news programmes respectively. The inclusion of such fixed effect is thought 
to capture all other news programme-specific characteristics (eventually not observed) other than 
the amount of crime news which may influence the perception of the relevance of crime.
The rationale for the functional form in (1) is that individuals may shape their beliefs on the 
basis of both the actual level of crime in their environment (Crime) and on the exposure to crime 
news (Crime_news).
In the second step we estimated the following equation
 Vote a bX cCrime impi i i i= + + +_ ϖ  (2)
where Vote is an indicator of voter choice in 2001 political elections, that is, vote for the centre-
right coalition and Crime_imp is the predicted value of Crime_imp as from equation (1), X is a 
vector of individual and regional controls, as in equation (1).
Our data are mainly from the 2001 Italian National Electoral Survey (ITANES), carried out by 
the Istituto Cattaneo, merged with other data from different sources.
The importance of crime for voter i is elicited by asking the respondent to state a value on a 
scale between 1 and 4, where 1 means ‘It is not important at all’ and 4 means ‘It is very important’, 
to the question ‘I will now list some social and economic problems discussed during the recent 
election campaign. According to you, how important is each of them in the case of Italy?’ One of 
the items was crime. Hence, each individual was asked to state his/her perception of the importance 
of crime on a four-point scale. One of the main problems with this measure of crime salience is that 
people with similar demographic, economic and social characteristics can use different subjective 
scales to evaluate the same phenomenon or to respond to the same question (Holland and Waimer, 
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1993). In order to overcome this problem and to increase the comparability across individuals, we 
have firstly computed the mean of the importance attributed to the fifteen items asked in the ques-
tion, hence we have computed the average importance for voter i, Mean
I
i
1
1=
15
=
∑
1
15
 where Il is the 
importance attributed by individual i to item l. A similar procedure was carried out for the compu-
tation of the standard deviation of the grades attributed to the fifteen items. Hence, our measure of 
(relative) crime importance is the grade given to crime by individual i standardized with respect to 
answers given as for other items by the same respondent
 Crime imp
I Mean
StdDev
i
Crime i i
i
_ ,=
−
 (3)
We used different measures to identify the impact of crime in the region of residence of the 
respondent. In particular, we made use of a diffused crime index and of an index of violent crime. 
Since the National Electoral Survey was conducted in May–June 2001, we consider both year 2000 
and 2001. Both variables are at regional level and the source is ISTAT, Statistiche giudiziarie. In 
what follows we will report only results for the diffused crime index in 2001, as it provides a better 
fit of the model and is a better instrument for Crime_imp.
Crime news coverage, in terms of minutes, is from Marchese and Milazzo (2001). In Italy, six 
major news programmes cover almost all the audience, they are: TG1; TG2; TG3; TG4; TG5; and 
Studio Aperto. The former three are on State-owned channels, while the latter three are on Mediaset 
channels owned by companies where the majority of shares are in the hands of Silvio Berlusconi’s 
family. In order to increase the variance of our ‘crime news coverage’ variable, we will exploit the 
information retrieved by answers to the question: ‘Which news programme do you usually watch 
most? (If more than one, please tell me the most watched and then the next)’. Hence, for most of 
respondents in our sample, we have the most watched and the second most watched news pro-
gramme. This allows us to carry out a principal component analysis across individuals for the 
crime news coverage of the two news programmes most watched by voters. In this way we exploit 
all possible information at individual level and increase the variability. Note that this variable can-
not be interpreted as individual exposure to crime news; rather, is it meant to indicate the propen-
sity of a particular mix of news programmes to spread crime news.
To sum up, we estimated an instrumental variable probit model, where the instruments for crime 
salience are both crime news coverage of the most watched news programmes and the presence of 
crime in the region of residence of the respondent.
In order to identify the parameter ϕ  in equation (1), we need to control for fixed effects of the 
news programmes (both the first and the second most watched ones). However, the choice of the 
TV programme could be endogenous to our model. In order to control for this case, we estimated 
a sort of zero-th stage in which the choice of the news programmes is endogenized by estimating a 
function of the type
 FirstNP A BControls CFather DAgedisti i= + + + +ξ  (4)
where Father is a vector of characteristics of respondent’s father and Agedist is the Euclidean dis-
tance between individual age and the age of the editor of the news programme. Controls include 
father’s education, political preferences and interest when the respondent was 14 years old. The 
rationale for including the father’s characteristics is to proxy prior beliefs of the individual in 
choosing news programmes, while the Euclidean distance allows for inclusion of an exogenous 
variation in the choice of the news programme.
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Equation (4) is estimated across individuals for both the most watched and the second most 
watched news programme by means of a multinomial probit model. A similar equation has been 
estimated for SecondNP. It should be noted that this procedure does not fully avoid problems of 
endogeneity, although it is considerably lowered. In fact, our assumption is that the supply of crime 
news is exogenous to the individual characteristics, hence the fixed value for news programmes are 
necessary to identify the marginal impact of exposure to such news on the salience of crime as 
perceived and stated by the individual.
In other words, we assume that once the choice of a given mix of news programmes is made, 
the single voter has no influence on the decision to supply a given level of crime news made by the 
editorial board of the news programme. It should be noted, however, that the fact that we omit ideo-
logical variables from the models may be relevant as ideology may significantly influence the 
choice of news programmes made by individuals. Unfortunately, we cannot explicitly test for this 
hypothesis and we think that this might be a relevant limitation of our model.
Furthermore, parameter ϕ  is identified only if crime news is not collinear to any omitted vari-
able of the news programme mix. This condition is mildly satisfied by including in (1) (condi-
tional) probability to watch the six news programmes’ fixed effects and by considering a hybrid 
measure of news coverage, as given by the linear combination of crime news coverage of the most 
watched and the second most watched news programmes whose weights are given by a principal 
component analysis. This aggregation procedure makes the likelihood of the existence of an omit-
ted variable bias less important. However, in what follows we will report also results when includ-
ing a different type of news, often considered highly related to crime, that is, the relevance of 
immigration news.
Finally, our first measure of voter’s choice, Vote, is the probability to vote for the centre-right 
coalition, hence for Berlusconi. However, there is an extensive literature on the flexibility of 
swing voters’ preferences (Feddersen and Pessendorfer, 1996; Robinson and Torvik, 2008). Given 
this characteristic, it is very likely that media may exert their influence especially on those indi-
viduals, hence by influencing their decision to swing their vote. In the present article, we do not 
characterize those voters on the basis of self-reported ideology on a standard ten-point scale, 
because of weak comparability across individuals. Rather, we focus on the probability to swing 
the vote from the centre-left coalition in the 1996 election to the centre-right coalition in the 2001 
election, and consider the crime policy issue since it is one of the most relevant for both centre 
right and centre left electorates (ITANES, 2001; Legnante and Baldassarri, 2010). As mentioned 
above, our main source of data is the 2001 Italian National Electoral Survey conducted by Istituto 
Cattaneo in the aftermath of the 2001 election, the period 18 May–18 June 2001. In this survey, 
about 2,700 individuals were asked to state their vote for both the Senate and the Low Chamber, 
as well as to respond to a long series of questions regarding their socio-demographic characteris-
tics and their values or political opinion. In the present article, we decided to focus on voting 
behaviour for the Lower Chamber (the majoritarian part) which is also often studied as a proxy 
for as the most representative of the Italian legislature since voting age is 18 (whereas for the 
Senate the voting age is 25).
As shown in Table 1 (see Supplementary Material at http://ips.sagepub.com), the survey slightly 
over-sampled votes for the centre-right coalition, which, in the case of our analysis, especially for 
swing voters, is not particularly problematic as all our regressions are weighted with weights pro-
vided by ITANES. Table 2 (see Supplementary Material at http://ips.sagepub.com) reports sum-
mary statistics of the main variables of interest. In Table 3 (see Supplementary Material at http://
ips.sagepub.com) we report both crime news coverage by news programmes in the first semester 
of 2001 and their relative audience, according to the 2001 ITANES survey. News programmes on 
State-owned channels (TG1, TG2 and TG3) casted 921 minutes with 54.64% of respondents 
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reporting one of them as the most watched news programme, while Mediaset channels (TG4, TG5 
and Studio Aperto) had 1.099 minutes of crime news with 45.36% of reported audience1.
Discussion
As stated previously, in the 2001 electoral campaign, the centre-right leader, Silvio Berlusconi, 
signed the so-called ‘Contratto con gli italiani’, in which the fight against crime in the cities was 
the only non-economic item in a list of five issues to be addressed by the new government. 
Furthermore, the most relevant issues debated during the electoral period were crime, immigra-
tion and taxes, with crime as the major shared policy issue between centre-left and centre-right 
voters (ITANES, 2001). To corroborate our assumption that exposure to crime news leads indi-
viduals to vote for the right, in Table 4 (see Supplementary Material at http://ips.sagepub.com) 
we report regressions in which the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the respondent has 
answered ‘centre right’ to the question ‘I would like to know what kind of government is more 
able to deal with the following problems: a centre left or a centre right government?’ and zero 
otherwise. In models 1 and 2 we do not consider potential endogeneity in the choice of the news 
programmes and consider both the sum and the principal component of crime news coverage by 
the first and second most watched news programmes. We find that our second measure of crime 
news coverage is highly significant and related to the support for the centre right for fighting 
crime. In models 3 and 4 we instrument the choice of the news programmes with equations in the 
form of (4). Interestingly, it emerges that all the fixed effects for the first most watched news 
programme lose their significance, whereas the second ones are now significant, and even more 
importantly, both measures of crime news coverage are now significant and positive. In addition, 
to be noted is the fact that the presence of crime in the region of residence of the respondent is 
not significant.
Hence, results in Table 4 seem to corroborate our assumption that crime is a particularly salient 
issue for the centre-right electorate.
Our instruments for the identification of the impact of crime salience on voting behaviour are 
the diffused crime index and crime news coverage (both sum and principal component). In order 
to be suitable instruments for our analysis, both variables should be relevant in explaining voting 
behaviour and not correlated with omitted variables in the second stage regression. In Table 5 (see 
Supplementary Material at http://ips.sagepub.com), we report results of reduced form equations, 
from which it emerges that both variables are strongly correlated with the choice to vote for the 
right. In addition, to be noted is that crime news fixed effects preserve their sign across the speci-
fications, although, when considering possible endogeneity, their significance is lower.
Table 6 (see Supplementary Material at http://ips.sagepub.com) reports the estimation of our 
instrumental variable probit model. In Panel A we report the estimates of our first step estimation. 
It turns out that, in models 1 and 2 both the sum and the principal component measures of crime 
news coverage are significant and positively correlated with the standardized measure of crime 
salience. Furthermore, the index of diffused crime is positive and significant. Second stage regres-
sion results are in Panel B and confirm our hypothesis that crime salience is a major source of votes 
for the right.
In models (3)–(6) we split the sample between centre-left voters and centre-right voters in 1996. 
It should also be noted that the number of observations drops because of individuals not remember-
ing or not stating their previous vote. Interestingly, it emerges that crime news coverage is an 
important determinant of crime salience only for leftist voters in 1996. Hence, it seems that persua-
sion in the form of crime news is very effective only for swing voters. The p-value of the Hansen 
over-identification test is always very high.
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As stated above, answers to the question on the salience of crime may be difficult to deal with 
because of different psychological scales of the respondents. We have made use of a standardized 
measure of crime importance as defined by (3) to ensure comparability across individuals. This 
new measure has the appealing characteristic to be continuous; however, it does not exclude per se 
the possibility that different individuals rank crime with respect to other political issues differently. 
In order to exclude also this last source of bias, we have considered answers to the question ‘Among 
the problems previously listed, you considered the following very important. Which one of them do 
you consider the most important? And which would be the next most important?’ Hence, we have 
coded a dichotomous variable, which takes the value 1 if the respondent has reported crime to be 
the first or the second most important problem to be addressed by the Government. Table 7 (see 
Supplementary Material at http://ips.sagepub.com) reports the results of this robustness check and 
shows the robustness of our results with respect to this different specification.
Tables 8 and 9 (see Supplementary Material at http://ips.sagepub.com) report further sensitivity 
analysis of our model; in particular, in Table 8 we add in the first stage a further item, that is, cover-
age of immigration news. Interestingly, this variable is never found to be significant in the first 
stage regressions across the specification. Hence, it seems that our standardized measure of crime 
salience is reactive to crime news coverage, but not to immigration news. Finally, in Table 9, we 
consider crime news four months before the election, in order to have a better identification. 
Interestingly, all the coefficients are larger than the ones in the specifications in Table 6 and the 
results are confirmed.
Finally, although the results of the Hansen-J test for over-identifying restrictions give comfort-
able values about the exogeneity of our proposed items, in Table 10 (see in Supplementary Material 
at http://ips.sagepub.com), we present results of some placebo regressions in which crime news 
coverage and crime salience are regressed on the decision to vote for the centre-right coalition. 
Also in this case our assumption about the exogeneity of crime news coverage seems to be verified 
since the dummy variable indicating whether voters actually voted for the centre right is not sig-
nificant, as is also the case for model 4 where the dependent variable is crime salience and where 
we control for the other items. These tests confirm our results.
In sum, from our data, it seems that TV may influence voters’ perceptions through specific 
channels. In particular, we have proposed sound evidence that an increase in crime news coverage 
in major TV programmes increases the salience voters assign to crime (also by taking constant 
crime rates) and hence the probability to vote for a specific party coalition.
Conclusion
Indisputably, media pluralism is one of the key features of contemporary democracies. In this arti-
cle, we have focused on the consequences of media (TV) power concentration on voting behaviour. 
We have used Italy as a crucial case due to its highly concentrated TV system, and crime as a policy 
issue due to its overall salience for the electorate studied. First, we have characterized the Italian 
TV system as ‘highly concentrated’, in contrast to previous, more general analyses of the Italian 
case as a polarized pluralist system, and we have theoretically distinguished political agenda set-
ting from media agenda setting. Second, we have shown how the political agenda has influenced 
the (TV) media agenda, especially with reference to the TV channels directly connected to the 
centre-right political leader. Third, we have shown how TV information has been selected in rela-
tion to key policy concerns of specific segments of the electorate – either centre-right voters or 
swing centre-left voters. We have then presented robust evidence on the capacity of the political 
agenda – framed in particular by the political leaders who have greater control of TV – to shape the 
media agenda and hence distort voters’ beliefs. With specific reference to Italy and to crime news, 
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we have found that the distortionary effect of TV was a substantial explanatory factor of the Italian 
2001 election outcomes. Beyond the Italian case, our contribution highlights the electoral conse-
quences of limited TV pluralism in a context where elections are highly competitive and swing 
voters are particularly crucial for winning.
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